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The War Next Door: What Pakistan's Investors Need to Understand About the Iran Conflict

Khizar Kahloon | March 12, 2026

Economy

Two weeks into the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, the global economy is operating under conditions that have no modern precedent. The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of the world's oil transits daily, is effectively closed. Brent crude has crossed a hundred dollars a barrel. Gold is trading above five thousand dollars an ounce. Pakistan has just implemented its largest single fuel price increase in history, adding fifty-five rupees per litre in one stroke. The KSE-100 has shed thousands of points since hostilities began.

For investors managing real capital in Pakistan, this is not a distant geopolitical event. It is the single most consequential external shock to the country's macro framework since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and in several respects, it is more dangerous.

The goal of this blog is to translate what is happening in the Persian Gulf into what it means for your portfolio.

What Actually Happened

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a massive coordinated air attacks against Iran. The strikes killed Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with dozens of senior figures. Iran retaliated immediately, striking back at Israel and US military assets and allied interests across the Gulf. The IRGC closed the Strait of Hormuz to Western-allied vessels. Israel also launched a ground incursion into southern Lebanon against Hezbollah.

The conflict has since settled into sustained air operations spanning most of Iran's provinces, while GCC states face direct security exposure, disrupted oil exports, and mounting economic strain from the Strait closure.

Mojtaba Khamenei, the slain Supreme Leader's son, was elevated to the position by the Assembly of Experts in early March, reportedly wounded himself, with much of his immediate family killed in the initial strike.

As of March 13, there is no ceasefire, no credible negotiation track, and no sign of de-escalation. Washington has demanded unconditional surrender. Tehran's new Supreme Leader has vowed to keep fighting and to keep the Strait closed.

The Oil Shock: Larger Than You Think

In January 2026, global oversupply had reached 3.4 million barrels per day. Brent was trending toward fifty dollars a barrel. The prevailing narrative was one of abundant supply and weak demand.

That narrative has been obliterated. Roughly one-third of total Gulf oil production is now offline. The immediate global shortage is estimated at 3.5 to 4 million barrels per day. If one accounts for the inability of Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar to export through the Strait, the effective shortage could reach 8 to 10 million barrels per day, representing up to ten percent of global consumption. The IEA, in what it has called the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market, announced on March 11 a coordinated release of 400 million barrels from strategic reserves, with the United States contributing 172 million barrels. This is more than double the 182 million barrels released during the Russia-Ukraine crisis in 2022.

It has not been enough. Brent closed above a hundred dollars on March 12 after Mojtaba Khamenei's first public statement as Supreme Leader included a vow to keep Hormuz closed. As of March 13, Brent sits at roughly a hundred and one dollars. Oil touched nearly a hundred and twenty dollars briefly on March 8 before Trump floated the idea of the US "taking over" the Strait.

Nenad Pacek, founder of the EMEA Business Group and one of the most respected advisors to multinational boards and governments on emerging market risk, highlighted during his recent briefing to member organizations that there is no immediate supply-side remedy. US shale cannot scale quickly enough, requiring months or potentially a year for meaningful additional output. Venezuela, even with Chevron re-engagement, could add only 800,000 to 900,000 barrels per day by year end. Saudi Arabia's east-west pipeline to Red Sea ports is a theoretical bypass, but Red Sea tanker availability and storage capacity are woefully insufficient for the 5.5 million barrels per day that Saudi was previously exporting through Hormuz. If the conflict extends, oil could reach a hundred and fifty to two hundred dollars per barrel. That is not a base case, but it is not a tail risk either. It is a scenario that markets are not yet fully pricing.

The Strait: Why Reopening Is Not Simple

For investors who assume the Strait will reopen quickly once hostilities pause, the logistics picture is deeply sobering. Ralf Schreiber of DHL, who has spent twenty-five years in global logistics, described conditions not seen during any previous crisis, including COVID-19.

Zero container ships have departed from Jebel Ali in the days following the closure. All major carriers (Maersk, CMA CGM, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd) have suspended Strait transits. Over 450,000 containers were stranded or circling outside the Strait within just the first week. Dry bulk transits have fallen by approximately ninety-one percent. On March 11, a wave of attacks damaged at least three commercial vessels. Insurance premiums for Strait passage have risen to half a percent or higher, with coverage unavailable in some cases entirely.

Alternative routes (Khor Fakkan, Jeddah, Oman) can collectively handle only about a third of normal Strait throughput, and congestion at these ports is worsening rapidly. Shipping lines are redirecting to Nhava Sheva in India and Colombo in Sri Lanka, bypassing Gulf ports entirely. Container forwarding costs from Europe could surge from under two thousand dollars to as high as six to seven thousand dollars per container, replicating the extremes seen during COVID.

The precedent of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is instructive. Despite sustained US-UK-Saudi military efforts, Houthi forces operating from mountainous terrain in Yemen kept that waterway largely closed for an extended period. Iran's capabilities around Hormuz, including drone warfare, navigation jamming systems, and the world's largest stockpile of underwater mines, are assessed as significantly greater.

This matters for Pakistan because the country's seaborne trade, including all crude oil imports, LNG cargoes, and a substantial portion of containerized goods, transits routes that are now either directly disrupted or experiencing severe congestion spillover.

The Duration Question

How long does this last? The honest answer is that nobody knows with confidence, and anyone who claims otherwise is selling certainty they do not possess.

Nenad Pacek's base case, which aligns with current market pricing, is that the active military phase lasts weeks rather than months. Several converging pressures support this view: oil prices above a hundred dollars are politically toxic in a US midterm election year, precision munitions stockpiles are being depleted at an unsustainable rate (fewer than seven hundred Patriot missiles were produced in all of 2025), and domestic opposition within the Republican base to prolonged foreign military engagement is real and growing.

But there is a critical nuance. Even if active hostilities pause, the analysis identifies a "stop-pause-restart" risk profile. Three conditions would need to hold simultaneously for the conflict to reignite after a pause:

The Iranian clerical regime must survive,

Netanyahu must remain in power (with Israeli elections scheduled for October 2026)

The Trump administration must retain its current posture.

If all three persist, renewed escalation in late 2026 and beyond becomes a realistic scenario.

For the investor who thinks in terms of probability distributions rather than single point forecasts, the range of outcomes is unusually wide. A short, contained conflict that resolves within weeks would see oil retreat toward the seventies and markets recover much of their losses. A prolonged conflict stretching into months would send oil toward a hundred and fifty or higher, trigger a global recession, and create second and third-order effects (inflation resurgence, rate hike reversals, emerging market currency crises) that would fundamentally alter the investment landscape.

What This Means for Pakistan

Pakistan imports virtually all of its crude oil and a growing share of its natural gas as LNG. The country's monthly oil import bill, which Finance Minister Aurangzeb has warned could skyrocket by six hundred million dollars, is the most immediate transmission channel. The unprecedented fifty-five rupee per litre increase in petrol prices, taking the pump price to over three hundred and twenty-one rupees, is the first visible domestic consequence.

The second-order effects cascade through the economy in predictable but painful ways. Higher fuel costs feed directly into transportation, electricity generation, and industrial input costs, all of which push inflation higher at precisely the moment when the SBP had been guiding it lower. The central bank's February projection of five to seven percent inflation for FY26 was predicated on oil prices well below current levels. If Brent sustains above a hundred dollars for more than a few weeks, that projection becomes untenable, and the rate-cutting cycle that has supported equity valuations and housing demand may stall or reverse.

The current account is the third channel. SBP reserves had reached an encouraging 21.4 billion dollars in February, well above earlier projections. But those reserves were accumulated during a period of low oil prices and improving export dynamics. A sustained oil shock erodes the current account rapidly: every ten-dollar increase in Brent adds roughly a billion dollars annually to Pakistan's import bill. The SBP's projection that the current account deficit would remain within zero to one percent of GDP assumed a very different oil price environment.

The IMF programme, Pakistan's fourth channel of vulnerability, is both a buffer and a constraint. The recent staff-level agreement on the EFF and RSF reviews, expected to unlock roughly 1.2 billion dollars, provides near-term breathing room. But the IMF's conditionality framework was designed for a low-oil-price environment. If the government is forced to choose between passing through global energy costs to consumers (politically explosive) and absorbing them through subsidies (fiscally unsustainable), the programme's targets become difficult to meet. The Fund has historically shown flexibility during genuine external shocks, but flexibility is not the same as a blank cheque.

The Pakistani rupee, which Nenad Pacek flags as "at risk due to oil and gas import dependency," faces pressure from multiple directions: higher import bills, potential capital outflows as carry trades unwind globally, and a strengthening US dollar (the typical safe-haven response during geopolitical crises). The rupee has held relatively well so far, but the resilience may be tested if oil remains elevated.

The Carry Trade Unwind and Capital Flows

One of the less discussed but potentially significant risks for frontier markets like Pakistan is the global carry trade unwind that Nenad Pacek highlights. Large hedge funds and financial institutions that had been borrowing cheaply in Japan and investing in high-yielding instruments across Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East are now moving capital to safe havens. This unwinding poses risks to emerging market currencies and equity flows.

Pakistan's equity market has already experienced heavy foreign selling in recent weeks. If the carry trade unwind accelerates, the pressure on both the PKR and PSX could intensify, regardless of Pakistan's domestic fundamentals. Gold, which has surged above five thousand dollars an ounce (trading at roughly $5,080 to $5,100 on March 13), reflects the depth of global risk aversion. Nenad Pacek’ briefing expects gold to continue rising over the coming one to two years given persistent geopolitical tensions.

The Regional Picture

Pakistan does not exist in isolation. The GCC economies, which host millions of Pakistani workers and are the source of roughly thirty billion dollars in annual remittances, face their own severe dislocations. Real estate markets across the Gulf are dormant. Construction activity is largely on hold. Tourism faces an extended recovery timeline. Payment delays are increasing, with sixty percent of EMEA Business Group clients in Saudi Arabia reporting collection difficulties even before the war.

Saudi Arabia, running a budget deficit of approximately sixty-five billion dollars before the conflict, faces a particularly acute fiscal squeeze if it cannot export oil. The Kingdom's ability to sustain contractor payments, government tenders, and public sector wage increases is directly linked to oil revenue. Any deterioration in Saudi fiscal health would eventually affect Pakistani workers and, by extension, remittance flows.

For the Pakistan Investor: Thinking Through the Scenarios

Rather than pretending to know how this resolves, it is more useful to think in scenarios and position accordingly.

In the contained scenario (conflict winds down within three to four weeks, Strait partially reopens, oil retreats to the seventies or eighties), the damage to Pakistan's macro framework is manageable. The SBP's rate-cutting cycle resumes, inflation stays within target, the IMF programme remains on track, and the equity market recovers. This is the scenario that current oil pricing in the nineties to low hundreds appears to reflect.

In the prolonged scenario (conflict extends beyond six to eight weeks, Strait remains closed, oil sustains above a hundred and twenty dollars), Pakistan faces a genuine balance of payments stress test. Inflation spikes, the rate-cutting cycle reverses, the current account deteriorates sharply, and the IMF programme faces strain. Equity valuations, already compressed, would face further de-rating. Sectors with direct oil exposure (OMCs, airlines, transportation) would suffer most, while export-oriented sectors (textiles) would face mixed effects from a weaker rupee.

In the escalation scenario (conflict broadens, oil approaches a hundred and fifty or higher, Gulf economies enter recession), the second-order effects on remittances, regional trade, and global risk appetite would create conditions unlike anything Pakistan has experienced since the 2008 global financial crisis.

The honest assessment is that the first scenario is the most likely, the second is plausible, and the third is a tail risk that cannot be dismissed. Portfolio positioning should reflect this distribution rather than betting on any single outcome.

What to Watch

The indicators that will determine which scenario materialises are identifiable. Oil price trajectory is the most important: sustained movement above a hundred and twenty dollars signals that markets expect a prolonged conflict. Any resumption of commercial container traffic through Hormuz would be the clearest signal of de-escalation. UAE-Iran bilateral diplomatic engagement could indicate localized stabilization. Shifts in Trump administration rhetoric toward negotiation rather than surrender demands would be significant. And the pace of precision munitions depletion, which constrains the campaign's duration regardless of political will, is a hard physical constraint that bears watching.

For Pakistan specifically, the SBP's next policy statement, the February current account data, and the trajectory of forex reserves over the coming weeks will tell us whether the macro framework is absorbing the shock or buckling under it.

A Closing Thought

The honest thing to say is that the range of outcomes from here is wider than at any point in recent memory, and that the coming two to three weeks will be decisive. Nenad Pacek, who has advised governments and multinational boards through every major geopolitical crisis of the past three decades, frames it well: plan for the best, prepare for the worst. The short-term damage from a few weeks of conflict is manageable and largely reversible. An extended conflict of months would represent something fundamentally different, requiring a reassessment of regional strategies, growth expectations, and risk appetite.

For those of us investing in Pakistan, this translates into a simple but uncomfortable discipline: resist the urge to resolve the uncertainty prematurely. Do not panic-sell into a contained scenario. Do not buy aggressively on the assumption that resolution is imminent. Build your positioning around the probability distribution, not a single narrative. And maintain enough liquidity to act when the fog clears.

The situation is fluid. I will update this analysis as developments warrant.

Disclaimer: This blog is published by Khizar Kahloon for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell any securities. The analysis draws on the EMEA Business Group Special Advisory Briefing (March 10, 2026) by Nenad Pacek, with logistics intelligence from Ralf Schreiber of DHL. No warranty is made as to the accuracy or timeliness of any information presented. Investing involves risk, including loss of principal. Readers should consult a qualified financial advisor before making investment decisions.

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